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The Relevance of Harm as the
Criterion for the Punishment of
Impossible Attempts
Sarah A. Christie*
Abstract There has been much debate about the relevance of punishment
in cases of impossible attempts. This article sets out the current position in
Anglo-American jurisdictions and considers the rationale behind punish-
ment in hypothetical impossible attempt cases in order to draw out the
key issues at the heart of responsibility. The cases of the inadequately
prepared attempt and the attempt which is doomed to failure are com-
pared to illustrate the relevance of the potential to cause harm in the
justification for punishing such actors. The article concludes with the
suggestion that the relevant criterion is the presence of the potential to
cause imminent harm, as opposed to future, speculative harm.
Keywords Criminal liability; Harm as a criterion; Impossible at-
tempts; Imminent harm; Future harm
Discussion of impossible attempts usually falls into one of two camps:
discussions focused on practical issues generated by the accused who
tries to import something which turns out to be innocuous or steal
something which turns out not to be there; and discussions focused on
theoretical issues generated by hypothetical examples of, amongst
others, an accused who tries to kill his victim using voodoo. The former
tends to be the remit of criminal lawyers, while the latter tends to be
tackled by legal philosophers. In reality, while there are clear practical
issues that need to be resolved as a matter of criminal justice policy (and
in the case of drug-related offences, that have very clear policy implica-
tions), the underpinning rationale for punishment in both discussions is
the same. Although the voodoo killer, doomed as he is to failure while
he adheres to his delusion, presents an unrealistic example of possible
conviction for attempted murder, his situation allows for discussion of
theoretical issues which, if dealt with properly, can only serve to render
the rationale for those realistic situations more robust.
It is now generally accepted that it is necessary to look subjectively at
the accused’s conduct when considering his liability for an impossible
attempt. This is done in the name of ensuring adequate protection for
society, acknowledging the potential in the accused to cause harm, and
acting to prevent that harm from being actualised in the future. The
focus is on what he believed he was striving towards, rather than the
reality of what he would have been able to achieve had he taken his
actions through to their conclusion. Thus, where the accused has tried
to import drugs but has been duped into buying and ‘importing’ a
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non-controlled substance, the approach endorsed in modern criminal
law is to focus on his perception of his acts at the time of the alleged
importation. This approach focuses on what he believed he was doing
(importing illegal drugs) and convicting him on that basis, rather than
the objective reality that he has been caught ‘importing’ a non-
controlled substance, and therefore has not, on the face of it, committed
any crime. This contrasts with the earlier approach which tended to
concentrate on what had actually been done, and acquit where that did
not describe a crime known to the law.
The current law
The current approach is played out through numerous modern cases.
Scots law proffers Docherty v Brown1 where the accused was convicted,
overruling earlier precedent, of attempted possession of Ecstasy not-
withstanding that he had been duped into taking possession of an
innocuous substance. He had been charged with being in possession of
Ecstasy with intent to supply it to others and had raised an objection to
the relevancy of the charge, arguing that it did not disclose a crime
known to Scots law. He then appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court
of Justiciary on the grounds that it was not possible for him to be guilty
of an attempt to import drugs when he was not in possession of any
drugs in the first place. The case sets out a useful overview of the
development of the law, starting with Hume who classifies an attempt as
the doing of an act by which the accused meant or expected to carry out
his crime, where he would have carried out the crime if he had not been
fortuitously interrupted or defeated.2 Three classic cases then developed
this principle as it applied to cases where commission of the crime would
always have been impossible. In HM Advocate v Anderson3 the accused
had been charged with attempting to carry out an abortion, but given
that there was no proof that the woman had been pregnant at the time,
it was classified as an attempt to do something physically impossible and
as such, the charge was held to be irrelevant as it could never be
considered a crime. This decision was then upheld in the later and
similar case of Semple v HM Advocate.4 Even allowing for the fact that
these cases represent an approach which we would now reject, the real
anomaly in the High Court’s interpretation of the law during this phase
of its development comes in the case of Lamont v Strathern5 which was
decided after Anderson and before Semple. In this case, the accused
was charged with attempted theft in a situation where, although he had
tried to pick his victim’s pocket, there had been nothing in it to steal. This
case shows an early instance of something akin to the modern subjective
approach. He was convicted because he had taken his planned acts
through to completion insofar as he could, and was only defeated by
1 1996 SLT 325.
2 Baron Hume, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland Respecting Crimes, vol. i, 4th edn
(Bell and Bradfute: Edinburgh, 1844) 27.
3 1927 SLT 651.
4 1937 SLT 48.
5 1933 SLT 118.
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the fortuitous emptiness of the pocket, which could not count in his
favour. This again highlights the departure from the thinking in Ander-
son where it was stated that fortuitous instances, such as the non-
existence of a foetus, were relevant to liability because the accused was
entitled to have charges against him construed strictly and to take
advantage of any opportunity to avoid conviction.6 In Docherty, the court
concluded by setting out an unambiguously subjective approach to this
issue and held that Anderson was wrongly decided, since the accused had
the intention to cause the victim to abort, whether or not this was
actually possible given the facts, and had carried out acts towards that
goal which went beyond preparation. Docherty, too, had intended to
possess and supply Ecstasy, whether or not this was actually possible
given the facts, and had carried out acts towards that goal which went
beyond preparation.
English law, in moving away from the earlier authority of Haughton v
Smith,7 gives us R v Shivpuri8 where the defendant was convicted of
attempting to be knowingly involved in the fraudulent evasion of a
prohibition on the importation of heroin, although, as in Docherty, the
defendant was in fact mistaken as to the nature of the ‘drugs’ and was
attempting to import an innocuous substance. In the earlier case of
Haughton, the defendant had taken possession of goods he believed to be
stolen, although in fact those stolen goods had already been intercepted
by the police and allowed to continue on their way to trap those waiting
to receive them. The defendant was acquitted of the charge of attempt-
ing to handle stolen goods on the grounds that he could not be guilty of
an offence which was impossible to commit; he could not have taken
steps towards the commission of the offence of receiving stolen goods
when there were no ‘stolen goods’ present in the particular situation.
Again, this adheres to an objectivist outlook, taking its lead from the
facts as they existed and relying on the fortuity of the absence of a critical
fact, rather than looking at the facts as the offender believed them to be.
The case was relied on throughout the Anglo-American jurisdictions
and set out the classic division within the so-called ‘defence’ of im-
possibility between factual and legal impossibility, where the former
provided for conviction, while the latter provided a defence because the
offender could never have committed the offence—here of receiving
stolen goods—in a situation where the goods were no longer, in legal
terms, stolen. The accused who set out to pick an empty pocket would
have attempted something which was factually impossible and would
still face conviction for trying to take something which was not, in fact,
there. The accused who set out to import cocaine but actually imported
baking soda would have attempted something which was legally im-
possible and would, by contrast, not face conviction given that he had
imported an innocuous (if viewed objectively) substance. Distinctions
between factual and legal impossibility are difficult to uphold, as the
6 1927 SLT 651 at 652.
7 [1975] AC 476, where the court held that there could be no conviction where
commission of the intended offence was impossible.
8 [1987] AC 1.
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distinction itself is a fine and largely semantic one. Classic examples
often cited of factual impossibility involve an accused firing at a bed,
intending to kill the occupant, who has just vacated it, rendering it
therefore factually impossible for him to commit murder, due to events
beyond his control. Legal impossibility is often illustrated by the accused
who shoots at a corpse believing it to be alive and intending to commit
murder. Here, it is claimed, the attempt is legally impossible because
even completing the proposed acts will not lead to something covered by
the definition of the crime of murder. Yet this could also be classified as
factual impossibility, where the accused’s ‘murder’ cannot succeed be-
cause of the fact that the victim is dead already, which can be described
as an event beyond his control. Given this confusion, modern practice is
to ignore this supposed distinction, and, indeed, in England, the situ-
ation changed, or at least appeared to change with the passing of the
Criminal Attempts Act 1981. This statute specifically excluded any
defence of impossibility, ensuring instead that the courts took a sub-
jective view of the individual’s conduct. In practice, however, the next
major case on this issue provided commentators with a fertile source of
material, given that the decision completely ignored the effect of the
legislation. In Anderton v Ryan,9 the defendant had bought a cheap video
recorder, wrongly believing that it had previously been stolen. She was
convicted of attempting to receive stolen goods, but this was quashed
by the House of Lords on the grounds that her mistaken belief about
the criminality of her actions should not convict her when her acts
were ‘objectively innocent’. This decision maintains the objectivist posi-
tion despite the intervention of the statute some four years earlier. It was
not until Shivpuri that the court had an opportunity to rectify this,
enshrine the subjective approach laid down in the statute, and overrule
Anderton.
Elsewhere, Australian jurisdictions now also reject the objective ap-
proach from Haughton. In Britton v Alpogut,10 the Supreme Court of
Victoria, in similar circumstances to Shivpuri, denied the relevance of
impossibility and the objective innocence of the accused’s acts. Alpogut
had packets of a powdery substance he believed to be cannabis hidden in
a secret compartment of his suitcase. In fact, the substance was neither
cannabis, nor any other prohibited substance. At trial, it was held that
there was no case to answer since the facts did not disclose a crime
known to the law. This was rejected by the Supreme Court, noting that
the Haughton approach had allowed the law to become sidetracked by
the issue of whether the crime would be possible to complete, rather
than focusing on the issue of criminal intent which should take centre
stage in an attempt case. It was held that, so long as there was evidence
of criminal intent, and acts which were more than preparatory towards
fulfilment of that intention, then the criteria for attempt liability had
been satisfied. The only circumstances in which the court was prepared
to accept the relevance of impossibility was in those, no doubt extremely
9 [1985] AC 560.
10 [1987] VR 929.
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unusual, cases where the perpetrator had carried out a course of action
which he believed was a crime, when in fact it was not. Whereas the
perpetrator bringing baking soda into the country believing it to be
cocaine would be guilty of attempting to import cocaine, the person
bringing in baking soda believing that it is a crime to import baking soda
would be guilty of nothing more than naı¨vety. Relying on the principles
set out in Britton, R v Mai11 saw a conviction upheld on appeal in New
South Wales where the appellant had been in possession of what he
believed to be heroin, when in fact the original blocks of heroin had
been replaced by the police with plaster of Paris. The court held that an
attempted crime was made out where the accused intended the relevant
acts, and had carried out acts more than merely preparatory to the
fulfilment of that intention, with no regard whatsoever paid to the ques-
tion of whether his crime would have been capable of completion. The
authority of Britton was further entrenched in South Australia by R v
Irwin12 where the appellant failed to succeed in overturning his convic-
tion for attempted aggravated robbery. He had demanded money from
an individual who did not have any money on him at the time. Since it
would have been impossible for him to rob his victim, given the lack of
any cash in his pockets, the appellant relied on Haughton to argue that he
should benefit from a defence of impossibility, and failed. 
North American jurisdictions have likewise moved away from ap-
proaches which placed any significance on the alleged objective inno-
cence of the accused’s acts. In Canada, the appeal in US v Dynar13 was
based on the fact that the acts could not have been carried through to
the completion of the intended crime. The accused had been charged
with attempting to launder money and an extradition order had been
requested by the USA. However, he argued that, since the police were
using an agent and clean money of their own in order to uncover his
criminal activities, the money he had been asked to launder was not in
fact the ‘proceeds of crime’ and therefore it would have been impossible
for him to commit the full crime of laundering the proceeds of crime. In
rejecting his appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court also emphasised the
need to look for mens rea and actus reus, and disregard notions of
possibility or impossibility. Among American jurisdictions, the position
set out in the Model Penal Code,14 has become the widely accepted
approach, denying as it does the relevance of any defence of im-
possibility, although development in this area has been tortuous, in
11 (1992) 60 A Crim R 49.
12 (2006)161 A Crim R 78.
13 [1997] 2 SCR 462.
14 Section 5.01: ‘(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of
the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if
the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (b) when causing a
particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the
purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further
conduct on his part; or (c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of
the crime. (2) . . .’.
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common with other countries where notions of factual and legal im-
possibility were adopted.
Legislative moves across Anglo-American jurisdictions have also con-
firmed this shift in attitude, in favour of subjective assessments of the
individual’s acts and away from acknowledgement of any significance to
be found in impossibility. Section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Attempts
Act 1981 specifically excludes the so-called defence of impossibility;
first, by stating in s. 1(2) that a person remains guilty of an attempt even
if he or she could never have carried the commission of the offence
through to completion and, secondly, by asserting, in s. 1(3), the use of
a subjective test to ascertain their intentions and whether those inten-
tions are criminal.15 Similarly in America, the Model Penal Code also
sets out a position in s. 5.01(1)(c), which has met with widespread
acceptance, stating that the accused is guilty of an attempt when he
meets the actus reus and mens rea aspects, looking at the circumstances as
he believed them to be, rather than those which actually occurred.
Canadian criminal law sets out its rejection of a defence of impossibility
in s. 24(1) of the Criminal Code, and the subjective approach to these
cases is shown in R v Scott16 where, in a situation very like Lamont, Scott
was convicted for his attempt to pick an empty pocket, on the grounds
that he had the mens rea and had carried out acts designed to lead to the
commission of the offence. Thus, both legislatures and the courts have
come, over the course of a number of decades, to a position where
impossibility is viewed as irrelevant to any assessment of the guilt of the
accused. Having examined the position as it currently stands, I turn now
to consider the underpinning rationale for the conviction of these
individuals, and whether the justifications used to punish them are
sufficiently robust.
Theories of punishment
Much has been written about the justification for punishing inchoate
crimes in general, and impossible attempts in particular.17 The perceived
difficulty lies in the fact that the individual carrying out something
which is not, ex facie, a crime does not necessarily cause obvious and
visible harm which can then be held up as justifying the imposition of
punishment. However, all jurisdictions do punish inchoate crimes, and
15 Section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 states: ‘(2) A person may
be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies even
though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible. (3) In
any case where—(a) apart from this subsection a person's intention would not be
regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but (b) if the facts
of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1) above, he shall be regarded as having had
an intent to commit that offence’.
16 (1964) 2 CCC 257.
17 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, ‘The House of Lords on Attempting the Impossible’ (1981) 1
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 149, and G. L. Williams, ‘The House of Lords and
Impossible Attempts, or quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal
33.
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the modern subjective approach ensures that those carrying out im-
possible attempts are also punished—for what they thought they were
doing. How, then, is this punishment justified? Inevitably, this rests on
distinctions between retributivist and utilitarian schools of thought.
Retributivism looks backwards to the attempted crime and seeks to
ensure that the offender repays his debt to society—either literally in
ancient ‘eye for an eye’ formulations, or metaphorically in ensuring
some deprivation and unpleasantness in order to offset the harm he had
inflicted on his victim and/or society. Utilitarian approaches look for-
ward to see what measures can be taken now to prevent future recur-
rence of crime, and justify the imposition of punishment by reference to
the benefit gained from the increase in security and reduction in crime
which offsets the pain and costs involved in punishment. This is where
we find the most common theory used to justify the punishment of
inchoate crime—that of deterrence. Deterrence comes in two distinct
guises: individual deterrence which targets the unpleasantness of pun-
ishment on the individual in order to make him think again before
committing a crime in the future; and general deterrence whereby the
threat and actual imposition of punishment for these crimes is seen to
act as a deterrent on other unspecified members of the community who
may be considering criminal activity. Punishment of the offender oper-
ates as both individual deterrence, and, where punishment is meted out
to him pour encourager les autres, as general deterrence, both of which
operate on a broader level to reduce crime and increase society’s sense of
protection and well-being. Punishment of the individual is justified as a
necessary evil in the face of this greater good.18
Rationalising punishment
The rationale behind conviction in all cases of impossible attempts rests
on the fact that the accused has the relevant mens rea and has carried out
the actus reus of the crime when considered from his perspective, and
ignores the strict reality of the situation that, for example, he has an
innocuous substance, rather than a prohibited drug, in his possession.
This is underpinned by notions of subjective dangerousness; the accused
has shown both his willingness to commit a harmful act, and that he had
the potential to commit real harm, had the world turned according to his
perceptions. Thus, the argument runs, it is necessary to punish him for
his attempt because, if we do not, he will simply try harder next time,
armed with the accurate knowledge he has gained in the process. Such
an approach can be found explicitly in any number of these cases; for
example, in Dynar, it is stated that:
. . . the purpose of the law of attempt is universally acknowledged to be the
deterrence of subsequent attempts. A person who has intended to do
something that the law forbids and who has actually taken steps towards
18 Although this approach has an understandably attractive quality, it does fall foul of
Kantian thinking, in treating the infliction of punishment as a means to another
end.
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the completion of an offence is apt to try the same sort of thing in the
future; and there is no assurance that next time his attempt will fail.19
This model for attributing blame based on assessments of dangerousness
and determinations of ‘harm’ relies on us accepting that the deluded
attempter will, at some point in the near future, carry out his criminal
desires again and successfully achieve the projected criminal harm on
this subsequent occasion, unless we act now to deter him. However, to
function as an approach in all cases of impossible attempts, it would
require that all failed attempters show a propensity to cause real harm
unless prevented by punishment. Is evidence of potential future ‘harm’
a sufficient criterion for convicting all failed attempters?
Types of failed attempt
To illustrate the various types of failed attempt and where the evidence
of potential harm presents itself, imagine the following.
Recently turned down for promotion by his employer and intent on killing
her, A takes aim and pulls the trigger. His victim dies instantaneously as a
result of a shot to the head.
Recently turned down for promotion by his employer and intent on killing
her, B makes a wax image and drives a pin through its heart in the belief
that this will cause her to die of a heart attack. His victim is unaffected,
although B believed her to be dead and was more than somewhat
surprised to see her the next day.
Recently turned down for promotion by his employer and intent on killing
her, C makes a wax image and tries to drive a pin through its heart in the
belief that this will cause her to die of a heart attack. Unfortunately, the
wax is too hard and the pin will not go through. His victim is unaffected,
which does not surprise C as he has already assessed his attempt at a
voodoo killing as a failure.
A clearly fits the paradigm of the intentional killer who has carried out
an act which caused the death of the victim, and rightly deserves
conviction for murder. Whether B and C both fit the paradigm of the
attempted murderer is less clear. B has attempted to kill using means
which are, to the outside observer, inadequate and more to the point,
fruitless and deluded. C has attempted to kill using those same fruitless
and deluded means, but, whereas B has proof that his means are
incompetent, C does not. However, given what has already been stated,
our focus here is the level of actual or potential harm that the accused
poses. A clearly poses actual harm to his victim in particular and to society
in general. B also clearly poses potential harm both to his victim and
society, in that, armed with his new-found discovery (that voodoo does
not work), and still nurturing a murderous intent, he is now better
prepared to go out tomorrow and, following A’s example, shoot his
employer in the head. B will ‘try harder next time’. C, on the other hand,
does not fit this pattern. All C now has is proof that he is not very good
19 US v Dynar [1997] 2 SCR 462 at para. 81.
The Journal of Criminal Law
160
at voodoo. He was intent on killing via his chosen, and deluded, means,
and he is no closer to achieving that goal than he was at the outset. He
now has proof that he is incompetent, but lacks the proof afforded to B,
that it is actually the means that are incompetent, rather than his level
of skill. Thus, C’s version of ‘trying harder next time’ would involve one
or the other of sharper pins or softer wax, whereas B’s version of trying
harder would involve the adoption of more conventional (and therefore
potentially successful) means, which will have a real probability of
causing harm.
The harm criterion
What does this say about harm as a criterion for punishment in these
cases? The rationale for insisting on punishment for inchoate crimes
rests on a number of premises: that the unpunished actor would go
undeterred as well as unpunished, would learn from his earlier mistake
and therefore become more a proficient criminal; that he has manifested
sufficient potential to cause harm to deserve punishment; and that his
criminality must be assessed by looking at what he thought he was
doing, rather than concentrating on the objective reality. Here, A would
be punished for the obvious actual harm he has intentionally caused. B
would be punished for the potential he has to cause harm, and his
willingness to bring that harm about. The rationale for punishing him
despite his lack of success in achieving his intended aim is that he had
the mens rea for the crime, carried out acts which went beyond prepara-
tion, and now knows better how to achieve his purpose. He would be
punished less severely to acknowledge the lesser harm that he had
caused, but would still be punished so that he did not unfairly benefit
from the fortuitous fact that voodoo does not kill people.
To examine their acts subjectively, taking account of the facts as the
accused believed them to be, is only the first step. Looking through his
eyes, A set out to, and did, kill his employer. Looking through his eyes,
B set out to and did kill his employer, only to have his misapprehension
corrected at a later date when he realised it had not worked. Looking
through his eyes, C had set out to kill, but had not yet achieved his
purpose. Thus, they all took decisions, and put in train courses of action
which were designed to lead to the death of their victim. They were all
prepared, at whatever point their acts came to fruition, to cause the
relevant criminal harm. While A caused actual harm, B and C only
showed the potential to commit harm, but that potential is what is
generally used to justify the need to punish them to deter them from
going further next time. However, B and C do not exhibit the same level
of potential. If we continue to assess B’s situation subjectively, he would
affirm that he still harbours a murderous intention towards his victim,
but is now aware that his previously chosen means are not adequate to
the task in hand and, since he is now able to appreciate the true nature
of things, he would choose different and more realistic means. As such
he has, at the point where he becomes aware that his attempt has failed
due to its incompetence, the potential to cause actual harm in an
imminent sense. His potential to cause the relevant criminal harm is
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now realisable; when he ‘tries harder next time’, in the knowledge that
he failed because of his choice of means, he will have the same likeli-
hood of success as any other would-be killer. It may be that the next
time he tries to kill his employer, the gun jams and the bullet fails to fire
and for that reason, he fails to achieve his purpose yet again, but given
that his resolve to kill is still present, there is a risk that he will kill his
victim at his next (conventional) attempt. The immediacy and realisable
nature of the potential harm that B manifests following his first failed
attempt to kill, is what justifies us in punishing him as a preventative
measure. C’s situation, viewed subjectively, is somewhat different. In his
eyes, while he still harbours a murderous intent towards his victim, he
remains unaware of the impossibility of achieving his chosen end by
those means and will therefore continue to employ them as, according
to the facts as he believes them, those means are adequate and, for him,
desirable. At the point where he becomes aware that his attempted
voodoo killing has failed due to his (but not its) incompetence, he has
the potential to cause actual harm only in a future, speculative sense—
crucially, his potential to cause harm is not realisable as yet. What he
lacks, in comparison to B, is the danger posed by his next, better
equipped attempt, which has much more likelihood of success. While B
will return to kill his employer equipped with a gun, C will again attempt
to effect a more carefully executed voodoo killing, which will, again, fail.
C will not manifest immediate and realisable potential harm until he
reaches the same epiphany as B, which will not occur until he has
exhausted his ability to find fault with his voodoo skills.
Assessing the attempter’s acts subjectively has been shown through
numerous cases to be an effective way of measuring their potential to
cause harm, by looking at their intentions and what they were prepared
to carry out, regardless of the fact that they failed to achieve this.
However, the examples of impossible attempts commonly found in case
law are somewhat different to the often-used hypothetical of the
voodoo killer. Yet, in examining how the principles behind the attribu-
tion of liability apply to the hypothetical case, light can be cast on the
validity of those principles in situations which generate ‘real’ cases.
What do we learn from looking through the attempter’s eyes? Attempt-
ing to pick a pocket which is actually empty, or attempting to supply
drugs when the tablets do not contain any such substance shows us the
intent in the attempter’s mind, and shows us the kind of criminal activity
he is prepared to carry out. If not deterred at this point, there would be
little, if anything, to stop him from going out tomorrow and ensuring
that he selects a pocket with a wallet poking out of the top, or from being
more careful about his choice of supplier, or demanding a sample to test
before buying any alleged drug. Attempting to kill someone using
voodoo also shows the intent in the attempter’s mind, and the kind of
criminal activity he is prepared to carry out, in his distorted version of
reality. For B, since he is now aware of the unsuitability of his chosen
means, deterrence has some purpose in terms of protecting society and
it is therefore worthwhile looking through his eyes to determine that he
was prepared to kill. If not deterred at this point, there would be nothing
The Journal of Criminal Law
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to stop him from going out tomorrow to buy a gun and shoot his
employer. However, the situation is rather different for C. Looking
through his eyes reveals that he is prepared to kill. If not deterred at this
point (and there would of course be a practical issue as to how this
activity would come to the attention of the authorities), there would still
be little to stop him from going out tomorrow to buy sharper pins, but
deterrence would have no practical effect in securing the protection of
society, as, unlike the previous cases, his subsequent acts would get him
no closer to the commission of criminal harm. 
Immediate versus speculative future harm—a more
robust approach?
Given this lack of immediate and realisable potential harm in C’s con-
duct, can there be the same justification for punishing him? Arguably,
punishment here does not serve the direct purpose that it does for B. B
is (hopefully) deterred from carrying out that immediate future criminal
act, and actualising the harm that had already been identified in him, by
the unpleasantness of his punishment. Were the law to punish C, it
would be done to deter him from carrying out some possible future
harm which is not, as yet, realisable by C without him passing through
a further stage where he comes to appreciate his misapprehension. Since
his acts do not manifest an actus reus, where is the justification for
punishing him to deter him from the future commission of crime? Long-
established doctrine dictates that there is no liability for thought crime,
but where the acts relied on do not objectively amount to a crime, and
were a failure even on a subjective assessment of his actions, is there
sufficient for conviction? How far removed is C from the thwarted
employee who sits at home that night drowning his sorrows and fer-
vently wishing for the death of his ungrateful employer? In arguing that
C should not be punished in these circumstances, I would pose the
following question: if the object of punishing failed attempts is to deter
those attempters from becoming full-blown criminal actors, what harm
is there is allowing C to continue with his misapprehension, and carry
out a second attempt to kill his employer, having perfected his voodoo
technique? No harm will come to the employer, and there are no
outward indiciae of his criminal activity which might alarm members of
the public. Indeed, he has done no harm at all in anything other than a
purely subjective sense and has, in the immediate future, no prospect of
being able to cause any relevant harm, given his continued delusion.
Thus, in order to apply the subjective approach endorsed in cases such as
Docherty and Shivpuri, there needs to be some further refinement if cases
such as C, hypothetical though they may be, are not to be caught when
there is no basis for punishment at that stage.
Any subjective assessment of the dangerousness of attempters needs
to take account of other factors beyond a straightforward assessment of
their view of their own actions. It also should take into consideration the
need for evidence of potential to cause harm where that harm would be
realised at the next available opportunity. All currently recognised cases
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of attempt liability manifest this. When Docherty was found in posses-
sion of what he thought to be Ecstasy, he would have been equipped to
ensure that the very next time he bought drugs with a view to supplying
them to others, he was sure about their content. Lamont would be better
equipped to be careful to choose a more obviously full pocket. When
Shivpuri was found in possession of something which was not heroin,
and Alpogut was found in possession of the hedge clippings, they would
both have learned from their mistake and ensured that, next time, they
took possession of heroin and cannabis respectively. In all these situ-
ations, once the accused becomes aware of the mistake he has made, he
will repeat his behaviour, correcting that mistake and causing the real
harm, if not deterred from doing so by some element of punishment.
However, in C’s situation, once he becomes aware of his mistake, he
will repeat his behaviour, correcting only what he believes his mistake to
have been (blunt pins and/or hard wax), and will therefore still fail
to cause any real harm. To return to the statement from Dynar, that
the individual who has shown intent and has taken steps towards the
commission of a crime will be apt to try it again, and that there would be
no assurance that he would again fail, it can be seen that this statement
cannot be upheld in respect of cases like C’s. C will, viewed subjectively,
be carrying out acts which were designed by him to kill his victim, but
will not show any evidence of potential harm which could be realised at
the next available opportunity. Without this, I would contend that there
is no justification for intervening to punish him at this point, and thus,
hypothetical though his situation might be, it illustrates an element
lacking in the standard blanket rejection of the defence of impossibility,
which simply seeks to look through the individual’s eyes to assess
whether his conduct as he believed it to be would lead to the commis-
sion of an offence.
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